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Abstract
We study the effects of firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease on corporate
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1 Introduction
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has sparked renewed interest from economists and
policymakers on the impacts of epidemic diseases on firms’ real decisions. While the
COVID-19 pandemic started out as a health crisis, it has since impacted every sector of the
global economy and has become both a demand and a supply shock. The pandemic is an
unprecented shock on corporate revenues and has magnified liquidity risk amongst U.S
firms.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of epidemic diseases on cash holdings amongst U.S
firms. We focus mainly on the most recent epidemic diseases. These epidemic diseases are:
COVID-19, H1N1, SARS, Ebola and Zika virus. Epidemic diseases tend to be unanticipated
and their impacts can sometimes be large and widespread leading to exogenous economic
shocks. The very nature of epidemic diseases implies that managers cannot fully anticipate
the pathways, intensity and the duration of each disease and their impacts on the wider
financial markets. Effectively, epidemic diseases create a wedge between current period’s
liquid assets and costly external financing in future states, which could lead to inefficient
investments in future states due to insufficient liquidity.1 That is, shocks induced by an
epidemic disease potentially affect the relative attractiveness of current period’s investments
when compared to future investments, leading to a fluctuations in cash flows, fluctuations
in the demand for cash and limited access to external financing.
In anticipation of a potential epidemic-induced negative shock(s) to the supply of external
finance, managers might accumulate cash. During such shocks, managers might build up
sufficient financial slacks so as to finance profitable investment opportunities in future states
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010,
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999, Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2009, 2011).
1For theoretical discussions on the impact of insufficient liquidity on investments and other corporate
policies, see Myers 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen,
1988, Lemmon and Roberts, 2010, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998, Tirole, 2006.
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The potential widespread of an epidemic disease might results in cash flow uncertainty. Firms
might be unable to meet their obligations as outlays might exceed revenues. There is ample
empirical evidence that managers consider having sufficient internal funds to finance future
investments outlays to be the main determinant of corporate policy decisions (Graham and
Harvey, 2001, Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2009). To mitigate against cash flow risk, firms
might significantly increase cash holdings during an ongoing epidemic disease. This is further
compounded by the fact that development and efficacy of a vaccine(s) can be unpredictable
and having sufficient financial slacks reduces the likelihood of liquidating valuable assets or
raising funds during an ongoing market wide exogenous shock.2
While epidemics tend to be aggregate in nature, their impact differs across firms and
sectors. Our first test focuses on firm-level exposure to epidemic diseases and impacts on
corporate cash holdings. We use Hassan, Hollander, Schwedeler, van Lent and Tahoun (2021)
measure of firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease. The measure is based on quarterly
earnings conference calls which are important venues during which managers directly repond
to (unfiltered) questions from market participants. Because of the Q&A nature of such
events, managers might potentially reveal some private information that might be useful
in quantifying the direct effects of an epidemic disease on firms’ real decisions. Hassan et
al. (2021) measure not only identifies the firms that are exposed to an epidemic disease at
a given point in time, but also captures the intensity of the exposure to each of the firm
identified. As a result, the measure allows us to directly quantify the impacts of epidemic
diseases on cash holdings amongst the U.S firms. To further validate our findings and to
take into account the potential aggregate effects of epidemic diseases, we employ a staggered
difference-in-difference approach in which we compare the cash holdings of firms before and
after the onset of an epidemic disease.
2For example, in the case of COVID-19, inspite of the currently available vaccines, the uncertainties
regarding the spread, mutation of genetic variants and efficacy of booster vaccines, imply that it is difficult
to determine the timeline and the duration of the epidemic. Managers might continue to accumulate cash in
anticipation of a stronger and more deadly variant, which might significantly impact firms’ future prospects.
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Using staggered difference-in-difference estimation strategy, we find a strong and
statistically positive relationship between the onset of an epidemic disease and corporate
cash holdings. But not all epidemics are created equal, our tests using the firm-level,
time-varying measure of exposure to epidemic diseases, reveal a strong and statistically
positive relationship between the onset of COVID-19 pandemic and cash holdings. We do
not find any impact on cash holdings from the other epidemics under consideration, that is:
SARS, H1N1, Ebola and Zika virus. The results reflect both the intensity and the
widespread nature of COVID-19 relative to the other recent epidemics. We also establish
the channel of transmission, showing that sentiments drive the demand for cash during the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. As the pandemic continue to unfolds, sentiments capture
real-time impact of stakeholders’ revisions on a firm’s future growth opportunities.
Specifically, we show that both positive and negative sentiments around COVID-19 have
direct impact on cash holdings. But that the positive relationship between COVID-19 and
cash holdings is mostly driven by negative sentiments around the pandemic.
Our paper contributes to two main strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on financing frictions and on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on U.S firms
(Acharya and Steffen, 2020, Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez-Orive, 2020a-b, Au,
Dong, Zhou, 2020, Ferrando, 2020, Greenwald and Paul, 2020, Almeida 2021, Brown,
Gustafson and Ivanov, 2020). And we also contribute to the broader literature on the
impact of epidemic diseases on financial markets (Bae, Karolyi and Stulz, 2003, Philipson,
1999, Kyle and Xiong, 2001). We provide evidence that epidemic diseases serve as
exogenous shocks, resulting in fluctuations in cash flows leading to an increase in the
demand for cash. We show that the COVID-19 pandemic, relative to the other recent
epidemic diseases, has the strongest impact on corporate cash holdings. We find that the
main channel of transmission is via sentiments. Specifically, via negative sentiments around
the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Second, we contribute to the literature on the determinants and the impact of external
shocks on cash holdings amongst U.S firms (Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010, Almeida,
Campello and Laranjeira, 2009, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004, Bates, Kahle and
Stulz, 2009, Harford, 1999, Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007, Keynes 1936, Almeida,
Campello, Cunha and Weisbach, 2014, Mikkelson and Partch, 2003). In general, this
literature finds that exogenous shocks create financing frictions, amplifying the importance
of liquidity management amongst firms. Firms respond by accumulating cash so as to
protect themselves against cash flow shocks. Consistent with this literature, we find that
cash is positively associated with aggregate business risk induced by epidemic diseases.
Our findings support the precautionary motive of cash holdings.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our firm-level data
and our measure of firm-level exposure to epidemic diseases. Section 3 outlines our estimation
approach and identification strategy. Section 3 also presents our empirical results. Section
4 presents some robustness tests. And section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Firm-Level Data
The sample consists of firm-quarter samples from Compustat for the period 2002Q1-2021Q1.
We require that a firm be incorporated in the U.S. We also exclude financial firms (SIC
6000-6999) and exclude utilities (SIC 4900-4999) because of the difficultly in assessing their
liquidity levels in the case of financial firms and because of heavy regulatory requirement in
the case of utilities. We also require that a firm has positive asset levels.
Table [1], presents summary statistics for the sample. Our main variable of interest is
cash. Cash is estimated as cash and short-term investment (CHEQ) adjusted by total assets
(ATQ). Cash has a mean (median) of 20.53% (11.74%). Observe that durng our sample
period, there is a considerable variation in cash holdings across firms. In particular, the
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bottom 25th per centile holds about 3.79% of total assets in cash and the top 75th per centile
holds about 29.9% of their total assets in cash.3 Figure [1] illustrates the cross-sectional
average of cash holdings for the period 2002Q1-2021Q1. The dotted vertical lines represent
the onset of each epidemic disease.
[INSERT Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
The remaining firm-level variables, determinants of cash holdings, are constructed as
follow: Firm size is estimated as the natural logarithm of total assets, Tobin Q is estimated
as the book value of total assets plus market value of equity less book value of equity adjusted
by total assets. Tobin Q is bounded above 10, so as to control for outliers. Leverage is the
sum of short-term debt and long-term debt adjusted by total assets. Net working capital is
estimated as net working capital less cash and marketable securities adjusted by total assets.
Dividend dummy takes the value of “1” if a firm pays dividend and zero otherwise.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2.2 Measuring Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Disease(s)
In order to measure firm-level exposure to epidemic diseases, we use the text-based
measure of Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, Schwedeler and Tahoun (2021). The measure is
constructed from quarterly earnings conference calls and captures each firm’s exposure to a
given epidemic disease. The measure extract specific and relevant information on the real
impact of various corporate decisions as firms response to challenges pose by the epidemic.
The measure is effective because it is constructed at the firm-level and capture each firm’s
exposure to each epidemic disease. In particular, Hassan et al. (2021) first identify the
most common symptoms associated with each epidemic disease. They extract this
information from resources including World Health Organization (WHO), online resources
and newspaper articles written at the onset of each epidemic disease. They would then
3Note: Our statistical distribution is consistent with prior literature: Bates et al 2009, Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007
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carry out human audit, subsample analysis, ensuring that the algorithm is indeed picking
up word or combinations of words that would be associated with each epidemic disease
under consideration. Disease exposure measure is then constructed as the number of times
a combinations (for example: synonyms for the symptoms of each epidemic disease)
appears in the transcript and this value is then scaled by the total words in each
transcript.4
The epidemic diseases under consideration are: COVID-19, SARS, H1N1, Ebola and
Zika virus. To this end, in the data we require that a firm epidemic exposure measure be
available in Hassan et al. (2021). The measure starts from 2002Q1 to 2021Q1, which is
our sample period. Table [2] presents a summary statistics of firm-level exposure to each
epidemic disease during our sample period.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3 Identification Strategy and Empirical Results
3.1 Identification Strategy
To measure the effect of firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease on corporate cash holdings,
we use the following augmented model of determinants of cash holdings5 :
Cashit = β0 + β
∗
1Exposure+X
′β + δi + ηj + ǫit (1)
where “Exposure” is firm-level exposure to a given epidemic disease and the measure is
extracted from Hassan et al. (2021). X is a vector of firm-level variables, determinants of
cash holdngs, which include: Firm Size, Tobin Q, Leverage, Capex, Net working capital,
and a dividend dummy. All our firm-level variables are constructed as outlined in Section 2
4For details on the construction of the time-varying firm-level measure of exposure to an epidemic disease,
see Hassan, Hollander, Van Lent, Schwedeler and Tahoun, 2021
5A variant of Opler et al. (1999), Bates et al. (2009) model of determinants of cash holdins
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above. δi and ηj are firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level
respectively. And ǫit is the error term. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent
and clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009, Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). We
outline our validation test in section 3.2.2.
3.2 Empirical Results
Our main research question is as follows: “Does exposure to an epidemic disease affect
corporate cash holdings?” Under the precautionary motive of cash holdings, firms are likely
to increase cash holdings in the even of a significant exposure to an epidemic disease. This
is because it is difficult for a firm to predict not only the pathways but also the intensity
and the duration of an epidemic disease. Firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease could
significantly impact both the supply of intermediate goods and the demands for final goods6;
affecting the length of cash conversion cycle. In order to hedge against extreme impact of
such an event, firms might build up cash balances.
Stated differently, exposure to epidemic diseases can create a wedge between the demand
for current period’s liquid assets and costly external financing in future states. The onset of
an epidemic disease can lead to financing frictions and as a result managers might increase
financial slacks and liquidity management becomes an important consideration. This is
because the onset of an epidemic disease tends to be largely unanticipated and the potential
impact cannot only be large but widespread across all sectors of the economy and even
globally. However, as epidemic diseases differ in intensity and duration, the impact of each
epidemic might vary across firms and sectors. Because all firms and sectors are not impacted
equally, using an appropriate measure might be the key to effectively narrowing down the
impact of each epidemic disease on firms’ real decisions. To account for this, we utilize
Hassan et al (2021) firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease as our main measure.
6See Guerreri, Lorenzoni, Straub and Werning (2020) on potential impact of the pandemic and its linkages
to both supply and demand.
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[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table [3] present estimates in which cash adjusted by total assets is the dependent
variable. Our estimates are for the whole sample period. The variable of interest is the
coefficient of each epidemic disease exposure. Columns [1,2] of Table [3] present estimates
for firm-level exposure to COVID-19 and estimates for the risk or uncertainty from the
COVID-19 pandemic. We find that firm-level exposure to COVID-19 has a significant
positive effect on corporate cash holdings (coeff.= 0.00583, t-stat=5.42). We find a similar
result in column [2], when we focus on the risk and uncertainty measure associated with
the COVID-19 pandemic (coeff.=0.0294, t-stat=3.95). Column [1] suggests that cash as a
fraction of total assets increased by 2.87% following exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Given that our “Exposure” measure is based on the length of discussion in quarterly calls
regarding the impact of an epidemic disease, the estimates suggest that firms with more
extensive discussions on COVID-19 pandemic are more likely to increase cash holdings.
That is, our results establish that there is a positive association between the COVID-19
pandemic and corporate cash holdings.
Columns [3-6] of Table [3] present estimates for firm-level exposure to the other recent
epidemic diseases under consideration. These othese recent epidemic diseases are: SARS,
H1N1, Ebola and Zika. We do not find any impact on cash holdings from exposure to these
epidemics for U.S firms. This is potentially because the duration, the intensity and the level
of U.S exposure to these epidemics was much shorter. In the case of SARS, for example,
it was detected in February 2003 and WHO declared the epidemic as having ended by late
2003. This means that the intensity of SARS was brief and that U.S firms were less exposed
to the SARS epidemic. As a result impact of SARS on corporate decisions was limited7.
The results in Columns [3-6] vis-a-vis those in coumns [1-2], suggest that both the intensity
and the duration of an epidemic disease are important consideration for corporate policy.
7Note that SARS had a higher infection rates in China and Mexico, firms in these countries might have
had a different response to the epidemic than the U.S firms- See Hassan et al 2021
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Note that the estimates of our firm-level controls are generally consistent with the extant
literature. In particular, Tobin Q has a positive coefficient, suggesting that firms with higher
growth opportunities tend to hold more cash. Size has a negative coefficient, suggesting that
smaller firms with promising future opportunities tend to hold more cash relative to large
firms. Large firms tend to have greater access to external debt financing (Boughes et al.
2006). The estimates of firm size also points to profitability of investment opportunities for
smaller firms and the observation that larger firms tend to have greater access to long-term
debt financing. The coefficient of leverage is negative, as cash and cash equivalents tend
to be use to mitigate financial distress. Cash flow has a positive coefficient. Firms with
higher cash flow volatility are more likely to accumulate cash (Shyam-Sunder and Myers,
1998, Opler et al 1999). Because capital expenditure (capex) might lead to an increase in
collateral base, its coefficient is negatively related to cash holdings since a large collateral
base minimizes demand for cash. The coefficient for dividend dummy is negative since firms
that pay dividend tend to be less risky, less financially constrained and generally have access
to external financing. And because cash and net working capital are substitute; estimated
coefficient of net working capital is negative.
3.2.1 Channel(s) of Transmision of Shocks: The COVID-19 pandemic
The findings so far have supported our main hypothesis that a widespread epidemic disease
has an impact on firms’ real decisions. In particular, we have documented that there is a
significant positive association between a firm’s coronavirus “Exposure” and its cash
holdings decision. To further support our empirical findings and to narrow down the main
channel of transmission, we focus on the impact of COVID-19 “Sentiments” on corporate
policy.8 Sentiments capture the impact of stakeholders’ revisions on a firm’s future growth
opportunities as the impact of the pandemic continue to unfolds. As a result, sentiments
8For discussions on role and construction of sentiments using textual analysis, see Loughran and McDonald
(2011, 2016), Hassan et al. 2021.
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are important in discerning the supply and the demand effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
at the firm-level. In order to assess the effect of firm-level sentiments on corporate cash
holding during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, we use the text-based firm-level
“Sentiment measures” from Hassan et al (2021).
In Table [4], we regress COVID-19 “Sentiment” measures on cash. Sentiments are largely
divided into two: positive sentiments and negative sentiments. Sentiments construction is
largely based on “tone”, that is whether a word has a negative tone ( such as:“loss”, “decline”
etc) or positive tone (such as: “great”, “good”, etc) and effectively serve as a measure of
shocks to firm’s future earnings or prospects (Hassan et al. 2021, Loughran and McDonald,
2011, 2016). Sentiments are therefore important in capturing managers’ expectations about
the future and as such have direct implications for firms’ cash holdings decisions.
In Table [4], columns [3,4] shows that both negative and positive sentiments explain
variation and have a positive impact on cash holdings across U.S. firms during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. However, when we separate out the effects of each sentiment measure
on cash holdings in column [5], we find that only the COVID-19 negative sentiment remains
positive and statistically significant. The result suggests that negative sentiments around
the COVID-19 pandemic drives the increase in cash holdings amongst U.S firms. The more
negative sentiments around the COVID-19 pandemic, the higher the likelihood of increase
in cash holdings. This result suggest that firms might be concerned about potential liquidity
risk post-pandemic. The result is consistent with the notion that as a firm is exposed to an
exogenous shock and faces financing frictions, liquidity management becomes a critical issue
for managers.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
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3.2.2 Validation Test: Using Difference-in-Difference Estimation Strategy
We validate our findings obtained from using the text-based measure of Hassan et al. (2021)
by employing a difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Since the timeline during which
each epidemic disease was most active and intense differs, we employ a staggered difference-
in-difference estimation strategy. Our specification is as follows:
Cashit = β0 + β
∗
1Epidemic dummy +X
′β + δi + ηj + ǫit (2)
where “Epidemic dummy” is an indicator variable that takes a value of “1” for the
timeline during which each disease was most active {i.e COVID-19 [2020-21], H1N1[2010-
12], SARS [2003], Ebola [2014-15], Zika[2015-16]}. Otherwise the “Epidemic dummy” takes
a value of zero. Effectively, “Epidemic dummy” captures the average effect of the epidemic
diseases under consideration on corporate cash holdings. X is a vector of firm-level variables.
Construction of each variable is outlined in section 2.1 above. δi and ηj are firm fixed
effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. Consistent with Petersen, 2009,
Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent
and clustered at the firm-level.
We present our estimates from using staggered difference-in-difference in Table [5].
Column [4] presents our estimates with the full set of firm-level controls and fixed effects.
The coefficient of “Epidemic dummy” is positive [coeff= 0.00957] and statistically
significant at the 1% level [t-stat=9.44]. This translates to an increase of about 4.6% in
average cash holdings over the unconditional mean of 20.53%. The result is consistent with
our overarching theme, that epidemic diseases have a material impact on corporate policy.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
3.2.3 Validation Test: The COVID-19 Pandemic:
In this section, we move our attention to the COVID-19 pandemic. Note that while the
COVID-19 pandemic started out as a health crisis, it has since impacted every aspect of
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the global economy; that is it has morphed into a macroeconomics shock impacting both
aggregate supply and aggregate demand. This suggest that it is not only important to take
the firm-level exposure into account but the aggregate impact as well. In order to validate our
results obtained using Hassan et al. (2021) measure of firm-level exposure to the COVID-19,
we employ a difference-in-difference estimation strategy below:
Cashit = β0 + β
∗
1COVID19 dummy +X
′β + δi + ηj + ǫit (3)
where “COVID19 dummy” is an indicator variable that takes a value of “1” for the
years 2020Q1 to 2021Q1 and the value of “0” for the year 2019Q1-Q4. X is a vector of firm-
specific variables (see section 2.1). δi and ηj are firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects
at the two-digit SIC level. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent and clustered
at the firm-level (Petersen 2009, Betrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).
Our difference-in-difference approach compares cash holdings of firms before and after the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Table [6] presents the estimates of equation [3] above. The
resuts show that there is a positive association between COVID-19 pandemic and corporate
cash holdings. Columns [2-4] shows that quarterly cash holdings as a fraction of assets by
the average firm increased by 0.0241 per centage points following the onset of the pandemic.
This is an increase of 11.73% relative to unconditional mean of 0.2053 (Table 1).9
Overall, consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimates in Table [6] suggest that the
average U.S firms significantly increase cash holdings in anticipation of unfavorable short-
term to medium-term poor economic outlook following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
This is because the COVID-19, being an exogeneous shock, potentially impacts the supply
of external financing in future states and firms respond to the shock by increasing financial
9This results is consistent with the output from a simple univariate analysis (untabulated). Average firm
cash holdings for the whole sample period (2002Q1-2021Q1) is 0.2053, average cash holding for 2019 is 0.183
and average cash holdings for 2020Q1-2021Q1 is 0.2295. This translates to an increase of about 11.8% over
mean cash and an increase of 25.4% over 2019 mean cash holdings.
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slacks so as to internally finance any profitable investment opportunities in future states
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, Jaffee and Russel, 1976, Duchin et al
2010).
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
4 Robustness
4.1 Accounting for Epidemic Disease(s) Timeline(s)
Since the timeline, firm-level exposure and the intensity of each epidemic disease differs, it
could be the case that using the whole sample period results in biased estimates. We restrict
our sample to the periods during which each epidemic was most active and in effect in the
U.S. Our timeline is extracted from World Health Organization (WHO) and from the Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Table [7] presents our estimates, the coefficient estimates in Columns [1-4] confirm our
baseline results that there is a positive association between the COVID-19 pandemic and
cash holdings. And that negative sentiments around the pandemic explain the rise in cash
holdings during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We also find no evidence that the other
epidemic diseases under consideration have any real impact on firm-level cash holdings in
the U.S.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Placebo: Falsification Test
One potential concern is that the documented relationship between corporate cash holdings
and the COVID-19 pandemic might be simply due to unobserved changes in investment
opportunities. Additionally, the extant literature has documented a rise in cash holdings
amongst the U.S firms starting in the early part of 2002 but increasing significantly after
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the 2008 financial crisis (Bates et al. 2009, Mikkelson and Partch, 2003) This would suggest
that- since our sample period includes this duration of acute increase in cash holdings- our
estimates are simply picking up an ongoing trend in cash accumulation amongst U.S. firms.
To address this concern, we re-examine our main hypothesis using a placebo test. The
key idea here being that if indeed our estimates are simply picking up a general ongoing trend
in cash holdings, then our placebo estimates should be statistically similar and consistent
with our reported estimates. That is, we should expect to observe a similar impact for our
placebo test. To carry out this test, we first assume an occurence of a “Placebo Epidemic
Disease” starting in 2007Q1 and ending in 2018Q4. Note that there is no real epidemic
disease that was active in our sample during this period; making this timeline appropriate
for our placebo test. We end our placebo period in 2018Q4 to ensure that our estimates are
free of any potential anticipation of the COVID-19 pandemic during the 2019 fiscal year.
Our Placebo dummy takes the value of “1” for the period 2017Q1 to 2018Q4 and “0” for
2015Q1 to 2016Q4, allowing us to compare a balanced data. We then compare firms cash
holding positions before and after the “Placebo Epidemic Disease”.
Table [8] presents our estimates, columns [1-4] shows that all our coefficient estimates
for the placebo dummy are indeed statistically significant but negative, which is opposite
to those estimates we find under the COVID-19 pandemic. This exercise demonstrates that
our results are attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and not due to any prior ongoing
trend in corporate cash holdings amongst U.S firms.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
4.3 Accounting for Firm-Level Political Risk
The macroeconomics implications of the COVID-19 pandemic have created an urgency for
policymakers to intervene in the economy. Extant literature has established that policy
uncertainty tends to be countercyclical; that is politicians are more likely to intervene in the
economy during recessions than during booms (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016). During this
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ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers in the U.S. have responded quickly by providing
stimulus in the trillions into the economy but they have also shut down significant parts of
the economy. Providing a significant stimulus has the effect of ameliorating the impacts of
the pandemic while the lock-down of the economy has the effect of accelerating the negative
impacts of the pandemic on some sectors of the economy. Given the conflicting impacts of
these policies, some firms might face different levels of political risk and might respond by
increasing cash holdings. The concern here is on whether our findings are attributable to
political risk faced by firms.
We examine whether firm-level exposure to political risk explains the rise in cash holdings
during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Extant literature has established that there is a
positive relationship between policy uncertainty and cash holdings (Duong et al. 2017,
Baker, Bloom, Davis 2016, Pastor and Veronesi 2012, Tut, 2019). To account for the impact
of political uncertainty, we use Hassan, Hollander, van Lent and Tahoun (2019) measure of
firm-level political risk constructed using tools from computation linguistics. The measure
is based on quarterly earnings conference-call transcripts and capture the extent and type of
political risk face by each firm. And the measure is highly correlated with firm real decisions,
stock market volatility, aggregate and sectoral political risk used in prior literature (Baker et
al, 2016). However, unlike the other measures of political uncertainty, about 91% of variation
in Hassan et al. (2019) political risk measure plays out at the firm-level, which makes it an
appropriate control for our study as all our main measures are at the firm-level.
Table [9] presents our estimates with firm-level political risk as an additional control.
The key idea here is that if our results are due to ongoing political risks, then we should
expect our measure of political risk to dominate our firm-level exposure to epidemic diseases
measure. However, observe that while political risk has a positive loading, the coefficients
of our measure of COVID-19 exposure remains positive and statistically significant across
all models. The results suggest that the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on corporate cash
holdings cannot be explained away by political risks faced by firms during the pandemic.
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[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
4.4 COVID-19, Cash and Financial Constraints
In this section, we consider whether the impact of COVID-19 on cash holdings vary in the
cross-section of firms by financial constraints. We might expect that firms that are financially
constrained might acumulate cash at a higher rate than their unconstrained counterparts.
This is because the impact of COVID-19 is widespread across all segments of the economy,
suggesting that it could impact not only the supply of external finance in future states but
might lead to a fluctuations in the supply of intermediate inputs, raw materials and in the
demand of final goods. As a result, financially constrained firms have a stronger incentive to
accumulate cash, either due to limited access to external financing or in anticipation of riskier
cash flows (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004, Whited and
Wu, 2004).
We use Kaplan-Zingales (1997) measure of financial constraints as our main measure.
Following Duchin et al. (2010), we classify firms as constrained or unconstrained by dividing
the sample at the median level. Table [10] presents our estimates; in columns [1,2], we
restrict our sample to the 2020Q1-2021Q1 timeline. To ensure that our estimates are free of
COVID-19 anticipation, we sort and classify firms based on constraint measure (KZ index)
during the 2019 fiscal year. Columns [3-4] presents the estimates for our full sample period.
The key take-away from Table [10] is that there is an increase in cash holdings for both the
constrained and unconstrained firms but that constrained firms increase cash holdings at a
higher magnitude than their unconstrained counterparts. The results are consistent with the
notion that during significant external shocks, financially constrained firms are more likely
to face costly external financing in future states and as a result tend to increase financial
slacks during such shocks. The positive loading on unconstrained firms suggest that, these
firms are concerned about giving up profitable investment opportunities in future states and
as a result increase cash holdings to mitigate the potential impact of COVID-19 pandemic.
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[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
4.5 Alternative Model of Cash holdings
Since a firm’s ability to generate revenue is a function of its total assets, we re-examine our
findings using an alternative model of cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999). Our dependent
variable is the natural logarithms of cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets
net of liquid assets. Our results are robust to using this alternative model. We present
our results in Table [11]. In columns [1,2] the impact of COVID-19 remains positive and
statistically significant, while there is no statistically significant impact on corporate cash
holdings for the other recent epidemic diseases under consideration.
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
4.6 Role of Leverage: COVID-19, Debt Issuance, Cash holdings
When firms are faced with financing frictions, they might increase cash holdings by issuing
debt (Acharya et al. 2007, Almeida, 2021). Firms might issue long-term debt to increase
cash position and preserve financial flexibility, that is firms might engage in precautionary
borrowing during significant financing frictions (Almeida et al., 2014). And because of the
otherwise healthy financial position of U.S banks during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,
lenders might be willing to extend more credit and provide some liquidity insurance (Acharya
and Steffen, 2020). The concern here is that perphaps access to external financing (via lines
of credit for example), explains the rise in cash holdings during the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.
To address this concern, we control for long-term debt issuance during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic. We estimate long-term debt issuance as the proportion of long term
debt issued adjusted by total assets. We interact both our COVID-19 exposure measure
and our COVID-19 dummy with long-term debt issuance. We present our estimates Table
[12]. Columns [3,6] in the table show that the coefficients of the interaction terms between
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long-term debt issuance and our COVID-19 measures are positive and statistically
significant. But note that the coefficients of our COVID-19 measures remain positive and
statistically significant. Our results are consistent with the notion that firms might draw
on their lines of credit to increase cash holdings, because when faced with aggregate risk,
cash is more desirable relative to lines of credit (Acharya et al. 2013, 2020). But cash is
also valuable as access to lines of credit might be restricted during exogenous shocks,
precisely when the marginal value of a dollar from external financing (via lines of credit for
example) is most valuable to the firm (Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey, 2011,
Tirole, 2006). [INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effects of epidemic diseases on corporate cash holdings amongst
U.S firms. In paricular, we address the following question: “Does exposure to an epidemic
disease affect corporate cash holdings”. In the presence of financing frictions, firms might
accumulate cash to hedge against random variation in cash flows. We argue that the onset,
pathways, intensity and duration of epidemic diseases are generally unanticipated and as a
result such events are exogenous to firms’ decisions. A case in point, the COVID-19 pandemic
started out as a health crisis, but has now morphed into both a demand and a supply shock
impacting every sector of the global economy.
We focus on the five most recent epidemic diseases: COVID-19, SARS, H1N1, Ebola and
Zika virus. To estimate the impacts of epidemic diseases on corporate cash holdings, we use
two estimation approaches. First, we recognize that there is heterogeneity in the intensity
and in the impact of each epidemic disease across firms and sectors. To this end, we utilize a
text-based measure of firm-level exposure to an epidemic disease. The measure allows us to
both identify the firms that are exposed to each epidemic disease and to quantify the impact
on firms’ real decisions.
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Second, taking into consideration the potential aggregate impact of epidemic diseases,
we use a staggered difference-in-difference estimation strategy to validate our findings. We
document a positive relationship between the onset of an epidemic disease and corporate
cash holdings amongst U.S firms. We find that, amongst all the recent epidemics under
consideration, the COVID-19 pandemic has the strongest positive impact on cash holdings;
reflecting its intensity and widespread impact on all the sectors of the economy. We find
that the channel of transmissions of COVID-19 shocks is via sentiments. Specifically, we
empirically demonstrate that the effects of COVID-19 on corporate cash holdings is mostly
driven by negative sentiments around the pandemic.
Taken together, our findings support the precautionary motive of cash holdings. In the
presence of financing frictions, firms might accumulate cash, preserve financial flexibility, so
as to hedge against potential adverse cash flow shocks. Our findings illustrate that epidemic-
induced shocks have material impact on corporate decisions.
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Figure 1: Average Cash and Epidemic Timeline
Figure [1] presents cross-sectional average of cash ( as a percentage of total assets) for the period 2002Q1-
2021Q1. The dotted vertical reference lines represent the onset of each epidemic disease. The epidemic
diseases under consideration are: COVID-19, H1N1, SARS, Ebola and Zika virus.
26
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics: Firm-Level Variables
This table presents summary statisics for the sample, which consists of non-financial and non-utility U.S.
incorporated firms in Compustat’s quarterly files for the period 2002Q1-2021Q1. Cash is estimated as cash
and cash equivalents (CHEQ) scaled by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. We require
that firm has positive total assets to be included in the sample. Tobin Q is estimated as the book value of
total assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity scaled by total assets. Dividend is a
dummy equal to “1” if a firm paid or issued dividend during period t. Net working capital is net working
capital minus cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets. Leverage is estimated as short-term debt
plus long-term debt scaled by total assets. Capex is estimated as capital expenditure scaled by total assets.
Mean Median Std. Dev 25th 75th
Summary Statistics:
Cash 0.2053 0.1174 0.2221 0.0379 0.2999
Cashflow 0.01719 0.02744 0.0744 0.0102 0.0426
Tobin Q 2.0938 1.6266 1.4084 1.1999 2.4472
Size 6.7299 6.6958 1.9081 5.4514 7.9593
Capex 0.0292 0.0154 0.0436 0.006 0.03363
Leverage 0.2585 0.2128 0.3047 0.0361 0.3809
Dividend Dummy 0.06236 0.000 0.2418 0.000 0.000
Net Working Capital 0.0376 0.0386 0.2494 -0.0468 0.1412
27
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics: Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Disease(s)
This table presents summary statisics for the sample, which consists of non-financial and non-utility U.S.
incorporated firms in Compustat’s quarterly files for the period 2002Q1-2021Q1. Data on epidemic diseases
is based on Hassan, Hollander, Van Lent, Schwedeler and Tahoun, 2021 measure. Panel A presents sumary
statistics for the whole sample (unrestriced) period. Panel B presents summary statistics for the timeline
during which each epidemic disease was most intense and active in the US.
Mean Median Std. Dev 25th 75th
Summary Statistics:
Unrestricted: PANEL A:
COVID-19 Exposure 0.0885 0.000 0.4759 0.0000 0.0000
COVID-19 Risk 0.00661 0.000 0.053506 0.0000 0.0000
COVID-19 Positive Sentiment 0.0235 0.000 0.1520 0.0000 0.0000
COVID-19 Negative Sentiment 0.0347 0.000 0.2105 0.0000 0.0000
SARS Exposure 0.0021 0.000 0.0471 0.0000 0.0000
H1N1 Exposure 0.0028 0.000 0.0604 0.0000 0.0000
Ebola Exposure 0.0012 0.000 0.0410 0.0000 0.0000
Zika Exposure 0.0010 0.000 0.0378 0.0000 0.0000
Restricted: PANEL B:
COVID-19 Exposure 1.3604 1.0329 1.3245 0.3862 1.9462
COVID-19 Risk 0.1016 0.000 0.1854 0.0000 0.1530
COVID-19 Positive Sentiment 0.3626 0.20627 0.4820 0.0000 0.5305
COVID-19 Negative Sentiment 0.5332 0.3359 0.6449 0.0000 0.7731
SARS Exposure 0.0436 0.000 0.1708 0.0000 0.0000
H1N1 Exposure 0.0150 0.000 0.1378 0.0000 0.0000
Ebola Exposure 0.0048 0.000 0.0869 0.0000 0.0000
Zika Exposure 0.0028 0.000 0.0742 0.0000 0.0000
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TABLE 3: Corporate Cash Holdings and Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Diseases
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Firm-level epidemic exposure are based on Hassan et al. (2021) firm-level exposure to
epidemic diseases measure. All regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at
the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Cash flow 0.0417* 0.0418* 0.0416* 0.0416* 0.0416* 0.0416*
(1.76) (1.76) (1.76) (1.75) (1.76) (1.76)
Tobin Q 0.0143*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144***
(13.75) (13.81) (13.84) (13.84) (13.83) (13.83)
Size -0.0256*** -0.0251*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249*** -0.0249***
(-11.41) (-11.24) (-11.15) (-11.15) (-11.16) (-11.16)
Leverage -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(-15.48) (-15.42) (-15.38) (-15.37) (-15.38) (-15.38)
Dividend dummy -0.00629 -0.00628 -0.00618 -0.00618 -0.00619 -0.00618
(-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.47)
Capex -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148***
(-9.88) (-9.97) (-10.02) (-10.01) (-10.02) (-10.02)
NWC -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.119***
(-10.64) (-10.67) (-10.70) (-10.69) (-10.70) (-10.70)
Constant 0.386*** 0.382*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.381***
(25.00) (24.90) (24.86) (24.85) (24.86) (24.87)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 144208 144208 144208 144208 144208 144208
R2 0.361 0.362 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.363
Note: t-statistics in parentheses: p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 4: COVID-19 and Corporate Cash Holdings
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Firm-level COVID-19 exposure are based on Hassan et al 2021 measure. All regressions
include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors
are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





COVID-19 Negative Sentiment 0.0133*** 0.0122***
(6.65) (5.39)
COVID-19 Positive Sentiment 0.0142*** 0.00231
(4.43) (0.62)
Cash flow 0.0417* 0.0418* 0.0420* 0.0414* 0.0419*
(1.76) (1.76) (1.77) (1.74) (1.77)
Tobin Q 0.0143*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144***
(13.75) (13.81) (13.79) (13.77) (13.78)
Size -0.0256*** -0.0251*** -0.0255*** -0.0254*** -0.0255***
(-11.41) (-11.24) (-11.38) (-11.32) (-11.37)
Leverage -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.126***
(-15.48) (-15.42) (-15.48) (-15.45) (-15.48)
Dividend Dummy -0.00629 -0.00628 -0.00625 -0.00628 -0.00626
(-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.49)
Capex -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.146***
(-9.88) (-9.97) (-9.87) (-9.93) (-9.87)
NWC -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.118***
(-10.64) (-10.67) (-10.64) (-10.67) (-10.64)
Constant 0.386*** 0.382*** 0.385*** 0.384*** 0.385***
(25.00) (24.90) (25.01) (24.94) (24.98)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES
N 144208 144208 144208 144208 144208
R2 0.361 0.359 0.360 0.360 0.361
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 5: Validation Test/Difference-in-Difference:
Firm-Level Exposure to Epidemic Disease(s) and Cash Holdings.
This table presents estimates from panel regressions using staggered difference-in-difference. Cash
holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent variable. Epidemic dummy is an indicator variable that takes
the a value of “1” for the timeline during which each epidemic disease was most intense and active
in the U.S. The Epidemics under considerations are: COVID-19, H1N1, SARS, Ebola and Zika
virus. All regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level.
All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
Epidemic dummy 0.00528*** 0.00957*** 0.00957*** 0.00957***
(4.93) (19.04) (9.44) (9.44)
Cash flow 0.0415*** 0.0415* 0.0415*
(6.84) (1.75) (1.75)
Tobin Q 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 0.0145***
(51.34) (13.94) (13.94)
Size -0.0256*** -0.0256*** -0.0256***
(-52.86) (-11.50) (-11.50)
Leverage -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(-69.35) (-15.41) (-15.41)
Dividend dummy -0.00568*** -0.00568 -0.00568
(-3.74) (-1.35) (-1.35)
Capex -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.142***
(-18.19) (-9.60) (-9.60)
NWC -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118***
(-45.01) (-10.64) (-10.64)
Constant 0.203*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 0.381***
(440.24) (112.98) (24.90) (24.90)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES NO NO YES
Clustered Std Errors YES NO YES YES
N 158194 144209 144209 144209
R2 0.006 0.358 0.358 0.358
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 6: Validation Test/Difference-in-Difference:
Firm-Level Exposure to COVID-19 and Corporate Cash Holdings.
This table presents estimates from panel regressions using difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Cash holdings (cheq/atq)
is the dependent variable. We focus on the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 dummy is an indicator variable that takes the a
value of “1” for the period 2020Q1-2021Q1 and “0” for the period 2019Q1-2019Q4. All regressions include firm fixed effects
and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
COVID-19 dummy 0.0297*** 0.0241*** 0.0241*** 0.0241***
(18.59) (23.30) (15.50) (15.50)
Tobin Q 0.00603*** 0.00603*** 0.00603***
(7.80) (3.19) (3.19)
Cash flow 0.0728*** 0.0728** 0.0728**
(5.53) (1.96) (1.96)
Size 0.0622*** 0.0622*** 0.0622***
(23.19) (6.16) (6.16)
Leverage -0.0919*** -0.0919*** -0.0919***
(-15.93) (-5.59) (-5.59)
Dividend dummy 0.0172*** 0.0172 0.0172
(3.31) (1.54) (1.54)
Capex -0.0532** -0.0532** -0.0532**
(-2.00) (-2.04) (-2.04)
NWC -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126***
(-18.77) (-4.25) (-4.25)
Constant 0.192*** -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.233***
(218.68) (-12.02) (-3.26) (-3.26)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES NO NO YES
Clustered Std Errors YES NO YES YES
N 18727 17347 17347 17347
R2 0.0539 0.129 0.129 0.129
Note: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 7: Restricted Sample: Corporate Cash Holdings and Firm-Level Exposure to
Epidemic Diseases
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent variable. We restrict our
sample to the duration during which each epidemic disease was most intense and active in the U.S. Our firm-level measure
of exposure to an epidemic disease is based on Hassan et al. (2021).The Epidemics under consideration are: COVID-19,
H1N1, SARS, Ebola and Zika virus. All regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC.
All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)





COVID-19 Negative Sentiment 0.00556*** 0.00549***
(4.88) (4.16)










Cash flow 0.0499 0.0512 0.0495 0.0500 0.0495 0.121* 0.0883*** 0.0557 0.125***
(1.57) (1.61) (1.56) (1.58) (1.56) (1.77) (2.58) (1.56) (3.25)
Tobin Q 0.00514** 0.00525** 0.00521** 0.00515** 0.00521** 0.00194 0.00502** 0.00681*** 0.00699***
(2.12) (2.16) (2.15) (2.12) (2.15) (0.62) (2.37) (3.64) (3.24)
Size 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.0780*** -0.0372*** -0.00908 -0.0335***
(7.66) (7.70) (7.71) (7.67) (7.71) (3.74) (-3.73) (-1.18) (-3.84)
Leverage -0.0818*** -0.0811*** -0.0821*** -0.0811*** -0.0821*** -0.0713* -0.0842*** -0.133*** -0.0977***
(-2.91) (-2.88) (-2.92) (-2.88) (-2.92) (-1.87) (-4.38) (-8.48) (-4.76)
Dividend dummy -0.00936 -0.00871 -0.00921 -0.00943 -0.00925 0.00745 0.0239** 0.00363 0.0120
(-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.40) (0.39) (2.18) (0.20) (0.95)
Capex 0.0303 0.0492 0.0339 0.0442 0.0335 -0.0796* -0.104*** -0.136*** -0.0751***
(0.75) (1.24) (0.84) (1.12) (0.84) (-1.89) (-5.08) (-5.73) (-2.94)
NWC -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.197*** -0.120*** -0.128*** -0.104***
(-4.37) (-4.36) (-4.39) (-4.36) (-4.38) (-4.49) (-5.40) (-4.31) (-5.54)
Constant -0.611*** -0.613*** -0.615*** -0.611*** -0.615*** -0.266** 0.479*** 0.289*** 0.449***
(-5.60) (-5.61) (-5.64) (-5.59) (-5.64) (-2.00) (6.77) (5.65) (7.04)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 9433 9433 9433 9433 9433 6099 15173 24405 14691
R2 0.126 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.127 0.102 0.316 0.326 0.301
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 8: Placebo Epidemic Disease: Falsification Test
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Columns 1-4 presents our estimates using the “Placebo dummy”. Our Placebo dummy
takes the value of “1” for the period 2017Q1 to 2018Q4 and “0” for 2015Q1 to 2016Q4. All
regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
Placebo dummy -0.00790*** -0.00845*** -0.00845*** -0.00845***
(-4.87) (-9.00) (-5.79) (-5.79)
Cash flow 0.0264** 0.0264 0.0264
(2.44) (0.52) (0.52)
Tobin Q 0.00461*** 0.00461*** 0.00461***
(6.26) (2.61) (2.61)
Size -0.00463** -0.00463 -0.00463
(-2.03) (-0.56) (-0.56)
Leverage -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.117***
(-22.45) (-6.99) (-6.99)
Dividend Dummy 0.0189*** 0.0189** 0.0189**
(4.16) (2.11) (2.11)
Capex -0.126*** -0.126*** -0.126***
(-7.98) (-4.78) (-4.78)
NWC -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.101***
(-16.77) (-4.80) (-4.80)
Constant 0.199*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.256***
(179.10) (15.75) (4.40) (4.40)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES NO NO YES
Clustered Std Errors YES NO YES YES
N 24455 22540 22540 22540
R2 0.0192 0.307 0.307 0.307
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 9: Accounting for Firm-level Political Risk
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Our measure of firm-level political risk is based on Hassan et al. (2019). All regressions
include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors
are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





COVID-19 Negative Sentiment 0.0132*** 0.0120***
(6.55) (5.33)
COVID-19 Positive Sentiment 0.0139*** 0.00226
(4.37) (0.61)
Political Risk 0.00281 0.00304* 0.00279 0.00312* 0.00278
(1.53) (1.66) (1.52) (1.70) (1.52)
Cash flow 0.0418* 0.0419* 0.0421* 0.0415* 0.0420*
(1.76) (1.77) (1.78) (1.75) (1.77)
Tobin Q 0.0143*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144*** 0.0144***
(13.75) (13.81) (13.79) (13.77) (13.78)
Size -0.0256*** -0.0251*** -0.0255*** -0.0254*** -0.0255***
(-11.41) (-11.24) (-11.37) (-11.31) (-11.36)
Leverage -0.126*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.126***
(-15.48) (-15.42) (-15.48) (-15.45) (-15.48)
Dividend dummy -0.00631 -0.00631 -0.00628 -0.00631 -0.00629
(-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.49) (-1.50) (-1.50)
Capex -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.146*** -0.147*** -0.146***
(-9.87) (-9.96) (-9.86) (-9.92) (-9.86)
NWC -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.118*** -0.119*** -0.118***
(-10.64) (-10.67) (-10.64) (-10.67) (-10.64)
Constant 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.384*** 0.384*** 0.384***
(24.95) (24.86) (24.97) (24.89) (24.94)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES
N 144194 144194 144194 144194 144194
R2 0.361 0.362 0.361 0.362 0.361
Note: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
35
TABLE 10: Financial Constraints, Cash and COVID-19
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Our measure of financial constraints is based on Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index. Firms
that are below median measure are considered as “Low” and those firms above median KZ index are
considered “High” constrained firms. All regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed
effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash Cash Cash Cash
Sample: Restricted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted
Financial Constraints: LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
COVID-19 Exposure 0.00159* 0.00248*** 0.00399** 0.00732***
(1.86) (3.42) (2.09) (6.91)
Cash flow 0.0662 0.0303 0.0245 -0.00320
(1.04) (1.56) (0.87) (-0.16)
Tobin Q 0.0135*** 0.00544** 0.0269*** 0.0193***
(3.83) (2.00) (15.72) (15.21)
Size 0.127*** 0.151*** -0.0272*** -0.0120***
(6.47) (7.14) (-7.29) (-5.57)
Leverage -0.0570 0.0406 -0.191*** -0.0210***
(-1.04) (1.22) (-9.14) (-2.85)
Dividend Dummy -0.0570 0.0205* -0.0233*** -0.00328
(-1.63) (1.71) (-2.90) (-1.07)
Capex -0.0345 0.00314 -0.229*** -0.0736***
(-0.57) (0.08) (-10.24) (-6.93)
NWC -0.327*** -0.171*** -0.239*** -0.0468***
(-7.11) (-5.82) (-11.13) (-4.78)
Constant -0.566*** -1.038*** 0.432*** 0.181***
(-4.34) (-6.34) (18.43) (11.04)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES
N 4734 4699 73415 70793
R2 0.219 0.171 0.108 0.0822
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 11 : Alternative Measure of Cash: Cash Holdings and Firm-Level Exposure
to Epidemic Diseases
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Our dependent variable is the natural log-
arithms of cash and marketable securities scaled by total assets net of liquid assets. Firm-level
exposure to epidemic diseases are based on Hassan et al. 2021 measure. All regressions include
firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level. All standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)













Cash flow 0.248 0.267 2.249*** 0.942*** 0.786** 1.034***
(0.88) (0.95) (4.71) (3.09) (2.22) (3.56)
Tobin Q 0.0217 0.0233 0.0365** 0.0591*** 0.0379*** 0.0770***
(1.40) (1.50) (2.57) (4.26) (2.80) (5.72)
Size 0.686*** 0.692*** 0.0862 0.136* -0.424*** -0.419***
(6.85) (6.92) (1.14) (1.71) (-6.18) (-7.19)
Leverage -0.575*** -0.564*** -0.795*** -1.354*** -0.672*** -0.796***
(-2.69) (-2.64) (-3.63) (-6.37) (-4.25) (-5.94)
Dividend dummy 0.0218 0.0315 -0.0603 0.137 0.172 0.0712
(0.14) (0.21) (-0.69) (1.23) (1.61) (0.77)
Capex -0.0116 0.259 -0.610* -0.767** -0.891*** -0.878***
(-0.02) (0.50) (-1.82) (-2.03) (-2.63) (-2.96)
NWC -1.141*** -1.139*** -1.465*** -1.403*** -1.206*** -1.084***
(-4.31) (-4.29) (-5.19) (-7.37) (-6.43) (-6.91)
Constant -6.613*** -6.633*** -2.451*** -2.597*** 1.036** 0.947**
(-9.35) (-9.39) (-4.95) (-5.13) (2.15) (2.30)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 9419 9419 9626 16768 15142 22256
R2 0.0673 0.0643 0.0361 0.0503 0.0419 0.0524
NOTE: statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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TABLE 12 : Cash, Debt Issuance and COVID-19
This table presents estimates from panel regressions. Cash holdings (cheq/atq) is the dependent
variable. Firm-level COVID-19 exposure to an epidemic disease is based on Hassan et al. (2021)
measure. All regressions include firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC
level. All standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash
COVID-19 Exposure 0.00176** 0.00182* 0.00155**
(2.45) (1.70) (2.28)
COVID-19 dummy 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 0.0209***
(9.55) (6.66) (11.59)
St debt X COVID-19 Exposure 0.000647
(0.09)
Lt debt X COVID-19 Exposure 0.00187
(0.65)
Lt debt Issuance X COVID-19 Exposure 0.00852***
(2.64)
St debt X COVID-19 dummy 0.0740***
(3.91)
Lt debt X COVID 19 dummy 0.0108
(1.52)
LT debt Issuance X d dummy 0.0274***
(2.79)
St debt -0.381*** -0.399***
(-8.35) (-10.57)
Lt debt 0.0101 0.00927 -0.0325** -0.0318**
(0.34) (0.32) (-2.35) (-2.28)
Cash flow 0.0667** 0.0678** 0.0677** 0.116*** 0.0936*** 0.0919**
(2.28) (2.24) (2.24) (3.26) (2.61) (2.56)
Tobin Q 0.00519** 0.00497** 0.00507** 0.00581*** 0.00643*** 0.00639***
(2.24) (2.10) (2.13) (3.04) (3.43) (3.39)
Size 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.0643*** 0.0632*** 0.0625***
(7.59) (7.76) (7.71) (6.24) (6.29) (6.17)
Dividend dummy -0.0113 -0.00412 -0.00534 0.0214* 0.0190* 0.0189*
(-0.51) (-0.18) (-0.23) (1.88) (1.69) (1.66)
Capex 0.0000668 0.0354 0.0177 -0.0819*** -0.0418 -0.0614**
(0.00) (0.91) (0.44) (-3.10) (-1.60) (-2.21)
NWC -0.367*** -0.103* -0.101* -0.336*** -0.0959*** -0.0931***
(-9.64) (-1.74) (-1.71) (-10.08) (-2.74) (-2.67)
Constant -0.607*** -0.639*** -0.633*** -0.257*** -0.263*** -0.257***
(-5.61) (-5.98) (-5.90) (-3.54) (-3.70) (-3.58)
Firm F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry F.E YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clustered Std Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 9445 9643 9510 17370 17619 17356
R2 0.178 0.127 0.128 0.155 0.115 0.116
NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses: * p:0.10, ** p:0.05, *** p:0.01
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